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THEORIES OF UNCERTAINTY: EXPLAINING
THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ERROR
IN INFERENCES
Vern R. Walker*
A central task in legal factfinding is evaluating the warrant for

a finding or the soundness of an inference from the evidentiary
propositions to a conclusion. This task is especially difficult when

there is much at stake, but the evidence is incomplete and the
soundness of the inference is uncertain.

Analyses of how to

improve such inferences have been made at various levels of
generality, and for different types of evidence. For example, one
general problem is distinguishing "scientific knowledge" from
"junk science," as required for admissibility in judicial proceedings
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, following the Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.1 decision.2 Another general

problem is evaluating inferences about unique historical events,
the kind of factfinding necessary in criminal cases.3 As opposed to
such general problems, some theorists address only particular
areas where inferences are difficult in law, such as the "lost
chance" cases,' cases involving "indeterminate plaintiffs,"5
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. Some of the ideas in this
Article were first presented on April 30, 2000, at the symposium, Artificial Intelligence
and Judicial Proof sponsored by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, the Cardozo
Law Review, and the Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, in New York,
New York. Preparation of this Article was supported in part by a research grant from
Hofstra University.
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.,
161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998); cf. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)
(holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 mandates a judicial gatekeeping obligation to
determine evidentiary reliability for all expert "knowledge," not merely "scientific
knowledge").
3 See, e.g., JOSEPH B. KADANE & DAVID A. SCHUM, A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS
OF THE SACCO AND VANZETrI EVIDENCE (1996).
4 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353
(1981); Vern R. Walker, Direct Inference in the Lost Chance Cases: FactfindingConstraints
Under Minimal Fairnessto Parties,23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 247 (1994).
5 See, e.g., Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 767-69, 782-84 (1984); Michael Dore, A
Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact,7
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inferences from "naked statistical evidence, ' 6 or inferences based
on DNA identification.7 Such problems of correct inference
cannot be solved purely by formal logic, nor can theorists merely
duplicate the role of the factfinder by evaluating the specific
evidence in a particular case. To be useful as theories of inference,
accounts can be neither too general nor too specific. They must
provide useful models for handling recurring types of inference in
situations where findings must be warranted by incomplete
evidence.8
In Western logic, the traditional strategy has been to distill
from inference problems any steps that have no uncertainty
associated with them. Such inferential atoms could then be the
foundation for inference. Traditional logic therefore isolates
deductively valid inferences. In a deductively valid inference, if
the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true.9 The
conclusion must be true whenever the premises are true.
Deductively valid inferences are also examples of what logicians
and mathematicians call "monotonic" inferences. An inference is
monotonic if new evidence cannot affect the validity of the

HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429 (1983); Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising
Epidemiology:A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1983); Steve Gold,
Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion,and Statistical
Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986).
6 See, e.g., Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of StatisticalEvidence, 65
TUL. L. REV. 457 (1991); David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderanceof the Evidence
Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 487; David Kaye, The Paradoxof the Gatecrasherand Other Stories, 1979
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101 (1979); Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship:Analyzing the
Process of Proof,66 B.U. L. REV. 439 (1986); David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89
YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (book review).
7 See, e.g., 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 1-39 (2d ed. 1993); D.H. KAY, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE 153-258 (1997);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE

(1996); Judith A. McKenna et al., Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, in FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 273-329 (1994);
Kenneth E. Melson, Determining Individuality by DNA, in ANDRE A. MOENSSENS,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 870-963 (4th ed. 1995).

8 A number of legal theorists have discussed the general problem of how to take
completeness of the evidence into account in factfinding. See, e.g., Craig R. Callen,
Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson:A Comment on ProfessorAllen's Theory, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 423, 431-39 (1991); Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating
Probabilities:A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 85-86 (1987); D.H.
Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 657, 658 (1986); Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1047-48 (1977); Lempert, supra note 6, at 473-74; Laurence H. Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329,
1349-50 (1971); Walker, supra note 4, at 286-97.
9 See, e.g., IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 25 (10th ed.
1998).
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inference." A deductively valid inference is monotonic because
the inference will remain valid regardless of how many new
premises are added and regardless of whether those additional
premises are true or false. Of course, new information might
undermine the truth of the original premises, and therefore the
"soundness" of the original inference, but the validity of that
inference is unaffected.
In contrast to monotonic inference, if reasoning is
"nonmonotonic," then the addition of new premises can cast doubt
on the validity of the original inference.' 2 Indeed, the new
information might not undermine the truth of the original
premises at all, but only the validity of the inference. For example,
the original premises might be the generalization that birds can fly
and the singular proposition that individual A is a bird. Given
these premises, it is reasonable to infer that A can fly. If new
evidence arises, however, indicating that A is a penguin, then this
inference is no longer warranted. The problem in this example is
that the original premises did not include all the information
material to the inference. When probabilistic, presumptive or
default reasoning is based on incomplete information, new
evidence can undermine previously warranted inferences.
This Article develops the concept of a "theory of uncertainty"
as a tool for warranting nonmonotonic inferences. It proposes that
theories of uncertainty have an explanatory function in inference
that is roughly parallel to the role played by theories of causation
in the empirical sciences. An adequate theory of uncertainty
provides a framework for explaining the warrant for
nonmonotonic inferences by explaining the possible sources of
error in such inferences. A theory of uncertainty should explain
the extent to which the available evidence warrants a particular
conclusion and the kinds and degrees. of uncertainty associated
10 See, e.g.,

GERHARD

BREWKA

ET

AL.,

NONMONOTONIC

REASONING:

AN

OVERVIEW 1, 24 (1997); GILBERT HARMAN, REASONING, MEANING AND MIND 30-32

(1999).
11 A deductive inference is "sound" if it is deductively valid and all of its premises are
in fact true. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 9, at 32.
12 For discussions of nonmonotonic reasoning, see, for example, BREWKA ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 1-3, 23-24; HARMAN, supra note 10, at 30-32. Such reasoning includes,
but is not limited to, the use of so-called statistical syllogisms. A traditionally formulated
an A. Therefore,
statistical syllogism has the following form: "Most A's are B's. This is.
this is (probably) a B." JOHN L. POLLOCK, NOMIC PROBABILITY. AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTION 76 (1990). For an early recognition of the difficulty of such

inferences in legal theory, see George F. James, Relevancy, Probability,and the Law, 29
CAL. L. REV. 689 (1941), arguing that the reasoning "[n]ine-tenths of all As are X, B is an
A, therefore the chances are nine to one that B is X" is not logically valid "except upon
the assumption that As may be treated as a uniform class with respect to the probability of
their being X." Id. at 697.
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with that conclusion. Such a theory may also help predict how
additional evidence might affect the warrant for that inference.
The proposal is that factfinders develop theories of uncertainty for
particular inferences from particular bodies of evidence, and that
the adequacy of those theories plays an important role in
warranting the inference itself.
This analysis is presented in three parts. Part I discusses
theories of uncertainty generally, and some of the characteristics
such theories have in common. Part II examines a theory of
uncertainty for conclusions warranted by scientific data. Such a
theory is particularly useful in evaluating conclusions about
generic causation and in assessing whether proffered scientific
opinions are admissible under Daubertand General Electric Co. v.
Joiner.3 Part III discusses the evidence charting theory of David
Schum, which is especially promising for inferences about unique
historical events. 4 These two extended examples illustrate how
the concept of a theory of uncertainty is useful in analyzing the
nonmonotonic inferences important in legal factfinding.
I.

THE ROLE OF THEORIES OF UNCERTAINTY IN WARRANTING
NONMONOTONIC INFERENCES

Factfinding in a legal context has, as a principal goal, an
"epistemic objective": the generation of findings that are accurate
descriptions of events and that are warranted by the legally
available evidence." Factfinding undoubtedly has other objectives
as well, but the epistemic objective is a paramount one. This
Article does not make an argument for adopting this epistemic
objective, nor does it discuss at any length why legal factfinding
has the epistemic objective as a primary goal. The Article
assumes, first, that findings that are accurate have instrumental
value in decisionmaking, and perhaps intrinsic value as well.
Accuracy should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of legal
activities, as well as their fairness to private parties. Second,
findings that are warranted by the legally available evidence help
provide due process and help legitimate the use of governmental
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
See, e.g., DAVID A. SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC
REASONING (1994); KADANE & SCHUM, supranote 3.
15 See VERN R. WALKER, Preponderance,Probability and Warranted Factfinding, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (1996) (legal factfinding has the goal of producing
"knowledge" in the sense of "warranted true belief"). For philosophical discussions of
warrant as being the difference between mere true belief and human knowledge, see, for
example, ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANT: THE CURRENT DEBATE (1993), and JOHN L.
POLLOCK & JOSEPH CRUZ, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 7-10 (2d ed.
1999).
13

14
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power. They also increase the transparency of governmental
process. The requirement of warrant also provides a check on
accuracy, as well as a strategy for increasing accuracy, at least in
the long run. This Article assumes the epistemic objective as a
primary goal in law, and uses the epistemic objective to develop a
model for analyzing nonmonotonic inferences in legal factfinding.
Legal factfinding adopts as a starting point our everyday
experience and our common account of it. That is, the initial
touchstone for accuracy and warrant is ordinary reasoning or
"common sense."
The common-sense ontology of everyday
objects and events is assumed to be adequate and does not itself
need to be warranted. Under most everyday circumstances,
people describe the World automatically, without reflection or
deliberation. Sitting in my study on a winter's day, I see a Postal
Service truck through the window, I hear the voice of my neighbor
as she answers her door, and I remember that the person who lives
down the street has gone on vacation. Such beliefs about the
world are so often accurate that there is seldom a need to
investigate their warrant. But in legal proceedings, when liberty
and wealth hang on the outcome, a witness's descriptions of the
world are routinely challenged. Whenever this is the case, we then
examine the warrant for that assertion. We evaluate the probative
value of the evidence we possess, and we may look for additional
evidence. If we encounter uncertainty and have a need to resolve
it, we turn to warrant as a means of doing so. It is this close
functional relationship between accuracy and warrant that leads to
bundling them together in the epistemic objective.
This Article proposes that a theory of uncertainty is one type
of construct we employ to help warrant a conclusion when we are
uncertain about the truth of that conclusion. This Part of the
Article discusses in general terms what I mean by a "theory of
uncertainty." The first section addresses the circumstances under
which we begin a search for the warrant behind our beliefs. Once
we understand when and why we initiate a search for warrant, we
begin to understand what can bring the search to a successful
close. In theory, we might successfully conclude the search by
obtaining all relevant information. But factfinding usually must
proceed on the basis of incomplete information. One important
question is when information is sufficient even though it is
incomplete. I propose that in most circumstances we develop a
theory of uncertainty in lieu of obtaining complete evidence. The
second section examines three dimensions that are inherent in any
adequate theory of uncertainty-namely, linguistic, logical, and
causal dimensions. The third section discusses why adequate
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theories of uncertainty generally integrate all three dimensions in
order to explain the potential for error within nonmonotonic
inference.
A. Triggeringand Ending the Search for Warrant
We typically engage in the activity of warranting because we
encounter an apparent inconsistency within a set of propositions,
all of which we are otherwise inclined to believe. We go through
life acquiring beliefs, holding them with more or less conviction,
often modifying them, and sometimes discarding them. At any
point in time during this dynamic process, we may find ourselves
inclined to believe two propositions that are inconsistent with each
other, in the sense that they cannot both be true. The strongest
form of inconsistency is logical, in which the inconsistency is
demonstrable by considering only the logical form and meanings
of the propositions involved. The proposition "I am the only
person in the house" and its negation ("It is not the case that I am
the only person in the house") are logically inconsistent. To
understand the meanings of the two propositions is to understand
that they cannot both be true. In symbols, the propositions P and
Not-P are logically inconsistent. But it is generally useful to relax
the notion of "inconsistent" to include physical inconsistency and
say that propositions are inconsistent when they cannot all be true
given our most basic beliefs about physical objects. For example,
alibi evidence in law can create an inconsistency in the evidence
because we believe that a single human being cannot be in two
very different locations at precisely the same time.
The
inconsistency involved is not a logical impossibility, for the
physical world could in theory obey other laws than it does, but we
consider it a physical impossibility given our standard worldview. 6
When we find ourselves inclined to believe a set of
inconsistent propositions, 7 we can conclude deductively that, if the
16 Stated in terms of propositional logic, we are inclined to believe three propositions:
P, Q and Not-both-P-and-Q. Let P be the proposition that a person is in place P at a
certain time, while Q is the proposition that the same person is in place Q at precisely the
same time, with locations P and Q being very different. Not-both-P-and-Q states our
belief that the person could not be in both places at the same time. The set of these three
propositions leads deductively to contradictions. For example, from P and Not-both-Pand-Q, we deduce Not-Q, which yields the contradiction Q-and-Not-Q. Discarding any
one of the original three propositions eliminates the contradiction. However, in this
example the proposition we are least likely to discard is Not-both-P-and-Q, because it is
too well warranted by our physical theories and general experience.
17 It is a question for psychology and psycholinguistics whether we should say that
human beings hold inconsistent beliefs or that they withhold belief when they become
aware of an inconsistency. There is no need or basis in this Article for deciding which is
the better description of human behavior. It would seem to make no difference to the
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inconsistency is real, then one or more of the inconsistent
propositions must be false. An apparent inconsistency within a set
of our beliefs creates a condition of uncertainty concerning that
set. Although we conclude that one or more of the relevant
propositions must be false, we may not know initially which
proposition or propositions are in error. For example, the
inconsistency might result from a complicated series of inferences
based on disparate pieces of evidence, and untangling that logical
web to find the problem is not always simple.18 Multiple
assumptions or inferences might be in error, as even the simplest
example will illustrate. Suppose that I am in my office, and I
believe that my new, red sports car is parked in parking lot B. My
colleague arrives from lot B, however, and claims that he did not
see it there and that he would have noticed it if it had been there.
I am now uncertain whether my car is there or not. I have some
reason to believe that the car is in lot B and some reason to believe
that the car is not there. There are numerous ways to account for
this apparent inconsistency. Perhaps I have. forgotten which car I
drove today or where I parked it. Perhaps my colleague was
inattentive when walking through the parking lot or is playing a
joke on me. Maybe someone has stolen my car. The epistemic
task, if I wish to undertake it, is to determine which of these
propositions is (probably) in error. One task of a theory of
uncertainty is to help understand and resolve such inconsistencies.
Before examining this epistemic task further, we need to
recognize and set aside the pragmatic aspects of the task. The
epistemic task may be to resolve the inconsistency, but in practice
I might decide not to undertake that task. It takes time and effort
to resolve inconsistencies among propositions we are otherwise
inclined to believe, and the decision to do so always occurs within
a practical context. Sometimes resolving the inconsistency takes
so little effort that we barely notice it as a separate activity. If
parking lot B is visible from my office window, I may merely look
to see whether my car is there. A deliberate decision, however, to
investigate and resolve inconsistencies involves weighing the
expected costs of investigation against the benefits expected from
the investigation. We tolerate many inconsistencies because
resolving them is not worth our while.

concept of a theory of uncertainty. The important point here is that inconsistency among
propositions leads to the search for warrant. Whether human beings can simultaneously
believe such inconsistent propositions is irrelevant.
18For an attempt to chart all of the evidence in a single legal case, see KADANE &
SCHUM, supra note 3. Some aspects of this theory are discussed infra Part III.
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For example, we tolerate different degrees of precision in
measurements, depending upon what is at stake and what it would
take to provide more precision. Suppose you and I are looking at
an object in the distance, and your estimate of the distance to that
object is 300 meters, while I think the distance is about 250 meters.
I have some independent reason to trust your judgment in such
matters, but I also think I am right in this particular case. In many
circumstances I might not care which estimate is more accuratefor example, when I am relaxed and watching the sun set. In other
circumstances, however, I might care a great deal and might take
additional measures to try to resolve the issue. For example, if I
were a professional golfer in a golf tournament, with money and
pride at stake, I might try (within reason and the rules of the
game) to resolve such an inconsistency. If I am not an excellent
swimmer, and you and I are estimating the distance across the
river, I might attempt to swim 250 meters, but not 300 meters. If
there is a desperate need to do so, I might attempt to swim either
distance. But whether golfer or swimmer, I may have no incentive
to resolve inconsistent estimates of 269 meters and 270 meters.
Such a difference would not affect my choice of golf club or my
decision to try to swim the river. The marginal benefit to be
gained by attempting to resolve such an inconsequential difference
in estimates would be outweighed by any effort needed to do so.
We can generalize upon these illustrations. At any point in
the dynamic of human activity, a person might decide not to
resolve inconsistencies among his or her beliefs and decide to "live
with" a particular uncertainty or potential for error. That person
might decide to spend the available time and resources differently.
We should not confuse pragmatic decisions about which
inconsistencies to tolerate or leave unresolved with the problem of
how best to resolve such inconsistencies given the decision to do
so. Decision theorists are concerned with how to analyze and
improve the pragmatic decisions. This Article addresses only the
epistemic problem of how to proceed with resolving the
inconsistency if we wish to do so.
The epistemic strategy is to resolve the inconsistency by
evaluating the evidentiary basis for each proposition in the set of
inconsistent propositions, and to determine which of the,
inconsistent propositions is more likely to be in error. The central
strategy for making progress is to focus directly on warrant and
sources of error, rather than on accuracy. Theories of uncertainty
explain the origin and propagation of falsehood, as contrasted with
traditional logic, which explains the preservation of truth. The
approach is to analyze the potential for error inherent in each of
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the inconsistent propositions by understanding the ways in which
each proposition might be false despite the evidence in its favor.
An objective of any theory of uncertainty is to understand the
circumstances under which each of the inconsistent propositions
can appear to be warranted and yet turn out to be false. If we
understand the possible sources of error in the supporting
nonmonotonic inferences, we may be able to determine which
propositions are more likely to be in error, or to devise a method
for investigating the propositions further.
A comprehensive analysis of any particular inconsistency
would investigate the warrant for each of the inconsistent
propositions, as well as the warrant for each proposition that could
be inferred from each of those propositions. That is, warrant
would be investigated "up" the inference chains that lead to the
proposition, and "down" the inference chains that lead from that
proposition to other propositions. Inferences in both directions
supply the warrant for the conclusion. Ideally, we would construct
a complete account of all of the possible sources of error
associated with each of the inconsistent propositions. Of course,
there are theoretical reasons why such a comprehensive approach
is impossible. The number of warranting relations increases
exponentially with each inferential step away from any particular
proposition, because each line of reasoning usually involves two or
more premises for each conclusion and each conclusion can play a
role in multiple lines of reasoning. For practical reasons, even an
approximation to a comprehensive approach is usually too costly
and too inefficient. It would also be ineffective, because we would
abandon the attempt long before the analysis is completed.
Human beings-and even computers-need heuristics to shorten
any investigation into warrant. We need an efficient process for
identifying possible sources of error and the propositions more
likely to be false. A good theory of uncertainty would have such a
heuristic function. It would help us decide which uncertainties are
more important than others, and why trying to resolve some
uncertainties would be more productive than trying to resolve
others.
This Article cannot analyze theories of uncertainty
theoretically or comprehensively. The purpose here is to illustrate
how a theory of uncertainty can improve nonmonotonic reasoning
epistemically by explaining the possible sources of error. Parts II
and III of this Article discuss two different theories of uncertainty,
which address two inference problems of importance in legal
factfinding-inferences about generic causation and inferences
Before turning to these
about particular historical events.
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examples, however, there are several generic features of theories
of uncertainty that highlight what to look for in such a theory.
B. The Three Dimensions of a Theory of Uncertainty
There are at least three distinct but interactive dimensions to
any account of warrant for a proposition: a linguistic dimension, a
logical dimension, and a causal dimension. This section briefly
discusses each of these dimensions. The relevance of each
dimension to a portrayal of uncertainty is based on the notion of
warrant and the task of warranting. The final section of this Part
discusses the usefulness and importance of each of these
dimensions in legal factfinding.
1. The Linguistic Dimension
A theory of uncertainty must have a linguistic dimension
because inconsistent propositions are indeed propositions, and
propositions are expressed in language.
Propositions are
statements that are capable of being true or false, capable of being
believed or doubted or denied, and capable of being translated
into different languages.1 9 In terms of English grammar, a
proposition is what is typically expressed by a simple declarative
sentence." When apparent inconsistencies arise within a set of
propositions, the first step should be to investigate the meanings
and structures of the linguistic expressions being used. Sometimes
the apparent inconsistency vanishes once the linguistic expressions
are correctly understood. Clarification of meaning or reference
can disclose that the inconsistency was only "apparent." Even
when true inconsistencies remain after we clarify meaning and
linguistic structure, we understand the nature of the remaining
inconsistency more precisely: we understand more precisely what
has to be resolved. Therefore, adequate theories of uncertainty
generally have a linguistic component or dimension.
One kind of problem is clarifying the meanings of the words
used. The desire to eliminate ambiguity of definition is one reason
that scientific and technical enterprises develop their own
technical languages. In a technical language, a new word may be
unambiguously assigned to every useful meaning or definition.
Unambiguous assignment is assured only if a word that has no
prior meaning is invented. There are various goals and tradeoffs
in inventing technical words. One loss in inventing such words is
19 See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 9, at 5-7.

20 See id. at 5. Linguistic expressions comprise a very broad category, including not
only natural languages, but also technical or specialized languages, and the formal or
artificial languages found in mathematics and symbolic logic.
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that prior connotations can sometimes inspire new concepts,
hypotheses, and theories. But inventors of technical words often
decide to pay that price in order to achieve clarity of definition.
Lawmakers, judges, and lawyers define and refine the meanings of
technical legal terms in order to treat similar cases similarly, and
clarifying the relevance and probative value of evidence is critical
to this effort. To the extent that terms with legal significance, such
as "fault" or "intent" or "cause," are vague or ambiguous, the
litigating attorneys, the judge, and the factfinder do not know what
evidence should count for or against a finding. Other problems
occur in trying to mesh ordinary language, technical legal terms,
and scientific or other specialized terms into a single factfinding
process. For example, under Daubert, federal courts must base
admissibility rulings in part on an evaluation of the warrant for an
expert opinion that is expressed in scientific terms, but in order to
do so they must determine the relevance of that opinion to a
A nonexpert
finding expressed in technical legal terms."
factfinder, on the other hand, is charged with weighing the
probative value of both expert and nonexpert testimony, and with
reaching conclusions expressed in legal terms, while evaluating the
inferences involved in terms of the ordinary language of the
factfinder.
The second kind of problem of meaning is the problem of
denotation or reference. A word can be used to refer to many
particular objects or events, and confusion over reference occurs
when a word is intended to refer to one thing but is understood as
referring to another. Pronouns (such as "he," "hers," "it") are
prone to use in confusing ways, and even proper names (such as
"John Smith") can have multiple referents. Expressions about
relationships can create confusion of reference as well, such as
"the next one" or "the other one." With some words the fact of
relationship is only implicit, and error is likely if the terms of
relationship are not clarified. An example is the concept of
mathematical probability, which involves a ratio between two
numbers. The failure to identify the denominator or reference
class can lead to both confusion and error. When the problem is
ambiguity of reference, merely inventing new words is not always a
solution. The problem lies in using the naming words of a
language in unclear ways.
An account of the meaning of a proposition explains not only
the connotations and denotations of the terms used, but also the
meaning of the proposition as a whole. Understanding what the
21 For an example of such a difference between scientific and legal concepts, see infra
note 55.
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proposition means involves understanding, at some level of detail,
what counts for or against its truth. In order to understand the
meaning of "the river is 300 meters wide," I must understand
something about how to test its truth. I may not understand its
meaning completely, or have a means to verify its accuracy, but I
must have a reasonably appropriate notion of what counts as
evidence for or against the proposition. I must know the
differences between "wide" and "deep,' ''meters" and "inches,"
and "300" and "30." I do not understand "the river is 300 meters
wide" if I think that it means the same as "the river is 30 inches
deep," or that a test of accuracy consists of inserting a yardstick
into the river vertically until it touches the river bottom. One
technique for learning a proposition's meaning is to observe the
methods used to prove its truth or falsehood. At least with regard
to a proposition that purports to describe publicly observable
objects or events, knowing what that proposition means involves
knowing what the world would look like if the proposition is true
or false.
An adequate theory of uncertainty would take into account
the meaning of the linguistic expressions used to state both the
conclusions to be reached and the propositions used to warrant
those conclusions.
Such a theory need not provide a
comprehensive account of that meaning, but only an account that
clarifies any unwanted uncertainty in that meaning. A theory of
uncertainty has primarily instrumental value toward achieving the
epistemic objective. It should guide the investigation into warrant
and improve the warrant and accuracy of the inferences, at least in
the long run. Even minimally explanatory theories can improve
the likelihood of epistemic success by elucidating the meaning and
structure of the propositions relevant to the inconsistency to be
resolved. Moreover, the linguistic dimension of a successful theory
would provide at least minimal criteria for what counts as relevant
evidence. A very good theory of uncertainty would explain how
the missing information makes a difference to the outcome of the
inference. In the case of nonmonotonic reasoning, we ultimately
would like to understand the nature and inferential significance of
the missing evidence. Understanding the materiality of the
available and missing evidence to the inference is as important as
understanding the meaning and relevance of the evidence.
2. The Logical Dimension
Theories of uncertainty should take into account the logical
relationships among the propositions relevant to the apparent
inconsistency. Propositional logic investigates logical relations
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between propositions (principally truth-functional relationships)
and provides models for an important class of deductively valid
inferences. 2 Predicate or quantification logic analyzes the internal
structure of simple propositions in ways that explain additional
deductive inferences.23 Systems of modal logic analyze deductive
inferences involving necessity, possibility, and impossibility. 2 All
of these formal systems investigate how logical form can explain
the possible deductive inferences among propositions.
Logical form is central to warrant and, therefore, to theories
of uncertainty. First, the recognition of inconsistency is what
triggers the search for warrant and the need for a theory of
uncertainty.
Recognizing a logical inconsistency requires
understanding the meaning and tautologous nature of propositions
of the form, "P and Not-P cannot both be true."' Understanding
a physical inconsistency requires adding the basic physical laws to
the logical laws, and recognizing contradictions derived from the
combination of those laws. For example, given the size and
physical nature of a human body, we can deduce that the same
body cannot be in two different locations one hundred miles apart
at precisely the same time. An adequate theory of uncertainty
would explain why or how two or more statements are in fact
inconsistent.
Second, an adequate theory of uncertainty would identify
inferences that are warranted by the rules of logic. For an
inference to be deductively valid means that if the premises are
true, then the conclusion must also be true. An inference is
deductively valid if simultaneously asserting, the premises and
denying the conclusion creates a contradiction.
Deductive
reasoning warrants the conclusion simply by the logical form of
that reasoning. An example of a deductively valid line of
reasoning is the form:
If P then Q.
P.
Therefore, Q.
Whenever this logical form accurately models a line of
argument,26 then the two premises deductively warrant this
22

See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 9, at chs. 10-11; Albert E. Blumberg, Logic,

Modern, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 12 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
23 See CoPi & COHEN, supra note 9, at ch. 12.
24 See, e.g., A.N. Prior, Logic, Modal, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 22 , at 5.
25 This is also known as the principle of contradiction, or the law of noncontradiction.
See CoPi & COHEN, supra note 9, at 389.
26 Because arguments are expressed in language, there is always a question of whether
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conclusion. For example, if "P" is replaced by the proposition
"this is a peach," and "Q" is replaced by "this contains
carbohydrates," and the demonstrative pronoun "this" in each
proposition refers to a single object, then the following reasoning
is valid:
If this is a peach, then this contains carbohydrates.
This is a peach.
Therefore, this contains carbohydrates.
Propositional logic provides an explanation for why the conclusion
must be true whenever the premises are true. Moreover, logical
theory explains why inferences of this form are monotonic, and
why additional premises cannot undermine the validity of the
inference. In any line of reasoning that is deductively valid, the
truth of the premises, together with logical theory, warrants the
conclusion.
A line of reasoning may lack deductive validity but
nevertheless be warranted. That is, an inference might be
acceptable epistemically, but it is not contradictory to assert the
premises and yet deny the conclusion. For example, some
inferences are warranted inductively, such as inferences from
sample data to conclusions about the population from which the
sample was drawn. It remains to be seen whether logical theories
can be formalized for nondeductive but warranted inferences. In
the last several decades, more dynamic logics have been developed
in an effort to model the relationships involved when tentatively
held beliefs are (for example) "defeated" or "undercut" by later
beliefs.2 7 Even if completely general theories of warrant are not
available for nonmonotonic reasoning, we do attempt to give
reasons for making certain kinds of inferences based on certain
kinds of evidence. A major portion of both the sciences and
common sense is devoted to developing such theories. An
adequate theory of uncertainty would explain the possible sources
of error in such inferences and the ways that the premises could be
a logical structure accurately models what is being argued by the linguistic expressions
used. If the logical model is itself constructed in a formalist language, the translation of
the natural language argument into formal logic can be considered part of the linguistic
dimension of a theory of uncertainty. On this view, whether an argument form written in
symbolic logic adequately models the meaning of a natural language argument is part of
the linguistic task of a theory of uncertainty. Even on this view, however, the theory of
why only certain argument forms in symbolic notation are deductively valid is part of
logical theory, not linguistics.
27 See, e.g., BREWKA ET. AL, supra note 10 (examining "default logic"); ISAAC LEVI,
THE FIXATION OF BELIEF AND ITS UNDOING (1991) (examining the justification for
revising a system of beliefs by "contraction"); POLLOCK, supra note 12 (examining "prima
facie reasoning" and "defeaters").
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true but the conclusion false. Such a theory of uncertainty has to
take into account the logical structures of the arguments involved.
3. The Causal Dimension
In addition to linguistic meaning and logical structure, we
often use causal accounts to help warrant propositions about
events. Examples include propositions warranted by first-person
sensory perceptions, propositions about the mental states of other
persons warranted by their behavior, and propositions warranted
by the testimony of others. First, assertions warranted by personal
observations draw upon an understanding of how sensory
perception works. We do not often question the evidentiary basis
for our observations about the world around us. But when our
assertions do come under scrutiny, we normally warrant our claims
using a causal theory of perception. From the earliest days of
human awareness of hallucinations and sensory illusions, people
have turned to causal accounts of perception to explain what is
warranted on the basis of perception and what is not. Today we
turn to optics, experimental psychology, and cognitive theory to
explain how vision works and how it can lead to mistaken
judgments. The cognitive and psychological sciences have also
enabled us to "deceive" the senses through sensory manipulation.
The role of perception in warranting propositions describing
the world depends upon the calibration of perceptions with the use
of certain descriptive predicates. A person learns how to use
appropriately many basic descriptive predicates (such as the basic
colors, sounds, and textures) in certain standard contexts (of
lighting, for example). The learner's reports are thereby calibrated
to those of others under such standard conditions. The person
then learns through experience how distance and ambient light can
affect the accuracy of reporting. People develop causal theories of
light and perspective, although sometimes they are very crude
theories. For example, in the case of vision, we use very simple
geometry to understand how perceived size decreases as the
distance from the perceiver to the perceived object increases.
Human observers must learn to use a causal account of perception
to adjust their assertions about reality, to the extent that those
assertions are warranted in part by personal perceptions.
Another familiar example of the causal dimension in
explaining possible sources of error is describing another person's
beliefs or other mental states on the basis of his or her behavior.
Once again, most of the time we are so adept at formulating
sufficiently true propositions about other persons that we have no
occasion to state the warrant for such propositions. But not
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infrequently in everyday life, and quite often in law, we investigate
the warrant for judgments about another person's veracity or
motive or emotion.
If pressed for the warrant for such
propositions, we resort to causal theories about "how people
work," and also about the personality of the particular person
under discussion. The better we know a person, the more likely it
is that we can describe accurately "what is going on inside of
them." We are forced to develop causal theories about specific
people because of the tremendous variability in how individual
human beings think and feel and act. We instinctively credit the
opinions of those who know them well, because the individual's
abilities, values, and patterns of behavior are essential elements of
the warrant.
The third example is warranting a proposition on the basis of
the testimony of another person. When a witness testifies based
on his or her past personal observations, the warrant for a
factfinder's conclusion based on that testimony draws on causal
accounts of the witness's past perceptions, current memory, and
veracity, as well as of the factfinder's perception of the witness and
ability to judge the witness's credibility. The types of causal theory
needed are not the same for each component of the warrant.
Some components draw upon optics and sensory psychology,
others upon knowledge of personality and human behavior. David
Schum's attempt to model this immensely complicated warrant is
discussed in Part III of this Article. The sole point here is that
causal explanations play an inescapable role in any adequate
theory of uncertainty about conclusions based on such testimony.
These three examples merely draw attention to the
warranting role of causal accounts. This Article cannot provide a
theoretical account of the relationship between causal theories and
theories of uncertainty. There is no reason to think, however, that
this choice of examples biases the conclusion. If we were to draw
the examples from scientifically warranted propositions, we would
still see the critical role of causal accounts. Scientific conclusions,
for example, are at bottom warranted by the perceptions of
individual investigators and the reports of many investigators
taken collectively. Moreover, the conclusions based on that data
depend for their warrant on a causal account of how the study was
designed and how the data were gathered. This type of warrant
will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.
C. Integrative Theories of Uncertainty
The previous section discussed the linguistic, logical, and
causal dimensions usually present in adequate theories of
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uncertainty. This section argues that these three dimensions are
normally integrated in any particular theory of uncertainty-at
least for any theory of practical use in law. Part of the argument
for integration is based on an analogy of function between causal
theories in the empirical sciences and epistemic theories of
uncertainty.
First, theories of causation and theories of
uncertainty both. play explanatory roles. A causal theory explains
the occurrence.of a given event in terms of the causal relationships
between that event and other events. A theory of uncertainty
explains the potential for error in a conclusion, using the
warranting relationships between that proposition and the
evidence. While a good causal theory explains why events happen
as they do, a good theory of uncertainty explains why a given
proposition might be false. This explanatory function is aimed at
increasing our understanding about either the events or the
propositions under study.
Second, good causal theories are not only explanatory, but
also predictive. A good causal theory allows us to predict a chain
of events into the future. If a particular causal account is true (for
example, one about lunar eclipses), then it can be used to predict
other events in the future, given the requisite conditions. Some of
those predictions provide tests of the accuracy of the conclusions.
If the requisite test conditions occur but the predicted event does
not, there is some reason to think that the causal account itself is
flawed.
The logical form of a simple predictive test is a variation on
"denying the consequent" or "modus tollens." If T stands for the
theory or set of propositions that constitutes the causal account, C
stands for the propositions describing the test conditions, and E
stands for the proposition describing the predicted event, then the
logical form of the reasoning behind the test is:
If T and C, then E.
C and Not-E.
Therefore, Not-T.
The causal account T comes into play in warranting the
conditional premise "If T and C, then E," which in turn helps
warrant rejecting, T if the test fails. The argument behind the test
is that if the causal theory (and conditional premise) is true and
the test conditions C are satisfied, but the predicted event E does
not occur, then the theory T is (probably) false.
The predictive function of a theory of uncertainty is evident
when the theory explains the limitations in the causal account and
predicts how the test itself might be flawed.
Theories of
uncertainty about each proposition might explain how the test
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conditions C might be satisfied and the predicted event E not
occur, but the causal account T might still be true. Different
theories of uncertainty might explain how Not-E could be
concluded inaccurately (perhaps we misread the evidence, and E
actually occurred), or how C could be in error (the conditions C
were not satisfied after all). Our reasoning could be wrong, and
the conditional "If T and C, then E" is incorrect. Such theories of
uncertainty, taken together, would explain how it is possible to
conduct the test and obtain results that seem to disprove T, yet for
T in fact to be true. These theories of uncertainty probably point
the way to further predictions or tests (with their own epistemic
limitations).
An ordinary and concrete example is predicting the mental
states of another person. Suppose I infer from your behavior that
you are angry with something I have done (I infer that A). I
reason that if you are angry (A), and if I ask you whether you are
angry (C), you will acknowledge your anger (E): that is, I reason
that if A and C, then E. Suppose I then conduct the test and ask
you whether you are angry, but you do not acknowledge being
angry (Not-E). I therefore decide that you are not angry, but I
cannot be sure that this is the correct conclusion to draw. I might
be misreading your behavior as a denial, when you do not intend
to deny being angry. Or you might be hiding your anger for some
reason I do not understand. I might then reevaluate my
knowledge of the circumstances and my theories about your
personality, in light of uncertainties about both.
Causal theories and theories of uncertainty also generate
useful descriptive predicates. Describing what I see as "an
automobile" bundles into that description an indefinite list of
predictions about possible sequences of events. For example, if I
were to walk in front of an automobile while it is moving, I predict
that I would certainly be struck, probably injured, and possibly
even killed. I know this because automobiles are relatively hard
physical objects, compared to my body, and because I have an
intuitive grasp of the basic laws of motion and mass. Descriptive
terms can be highly efficient means of communicating or reasoning
if they bundle into their meaning implications that have predictive
and explanatory value. The descriptive function of a theory of
uncertainty is less obvious from the grammar of English.
Descriptive uncertainty tends to be expressed through adjectives
(such as "somewhat" or "vague"), adverbs ("apparently" or
"seemingly"), and verbs ("appears to be"), rather than through
nouns. Nevertheless, there are numerous ways in English to
express the uncertainty associated with a descriptive sentence
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(such as "the automobile seemed to be moving").
Words
expressing uncertainty often modify entire propositions and
thereby qualify the descriptive function of that proposition.
Theories of uncertainty are like causal theories in tending to
integrate these explanatory, predictive, and descriptive functions
into a single account. Theories of uncertainty, however, are also
distinguishable from causal theories. The primary function of a
theory of uncertainty is not to explain events, but to explain how
conclusions could be false, despite the available evidence. In the
context of legal factfinding, we use theories of uncertainty to
achieve the epistemic objective. We try to understand the warrant
behind apparently inconsistent propositions, taking into account
all of the available evidence.
Through such theories, we
understand the risk of error associated with finding a proposition
to be true. If we can reduce that risk of error sufficiently, we
might also achieve more accurate inferences, at least in the long
run. Whether our factfinding accuracy actually improves depends
upon many factors, only one of which is the adequacy of our
theory of uncertainty.
Theories of uncertainty try to reconcile evidence, reasoning,
and conclusions into a coherent whole, by explaining how error
might arise in making either a type of inference or a specific
inference. Theories of uncertainty draw selectively upon causal
theories, as needed to address the particular propositions at issue,
with their linguistic and logical dimensions. In order to explain
error, theories of uncertainty must explain why certain events are
"evidence" relevant to certain propositions, and why the available
evidence warrants certain propositions and not others. These
tasks require integrating the three dimensions of linguistic
meaning, logical implications, and causal theories into an adequate
theory of uncertainty about each possible conclusion. Such
theories can be very general, applying to a type of evidence or a
type of conclusion. Other theories of uncertainty might be specific
to the particular evidence and conclusion under review. Just as
useful causal theories range from broad scientific theories (such as
theories of mechanics for any moving body) to particularized lay
theories (such as theories to explain my son's buying decisions), so
too theories of uncertainty range from the generic to the specific.
We tailor our theories of uncertainty to the task at hand. A theory
of uncertainty might be either simple or complex, depending upon
the pragmatic context and the level of uncertainty that is tolerable.
In a trial, the competing "stories" that adversarial attorneys
tell to juries in the closing arguments usually exhibit both generic
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and specific theories of uncertainty.28 Such stories are designed to
integrate all of the evidence presented and to emphasize some
uncertainties over others, depending on the party's interests. The
competing accounts explore the linguistic ambiguities of
testimonial evidence, the appropriate interpretations of other
evidence, the logical implications of the advocated accounts of the
evidence, the possible motivations of the witnesses in giving the
testimony, and so forth. Expert testimony is evaluated in much the
same way, but with more emphasis on theories of uncertainty
about inferences to be drawn from scientific data and from any
physical evidence in the particular case, such as DNA evidence.
The linguistic, logical, and causal accounts of all the legally
available evidence are integrated into a single theory about which
inferences are warranted and which are not. Because the evidence
is almost always incomplete and warranted certitude is normally
out of the question, the contest is over which conclusions are
better warranted by the evidence. Each party develops theories of
uncertainty to explain how the available evidence warrants a
particular conclusion, and how the missing evidence (were it
available) would not undermine that conclusion.
Tactically
speaking, each party's theory of uncertainty is framed by the
standard of proof established for the case and by how the burdens
of persuasion are assigned.
Legal factfinding is not confined to adversarial trials in courts,
where the admissibility of evidence is governed -by the law of
evidence. Factfinding often occurs in administrative proceedings,
for example, in either an adjudicatory or a rule-making setting,
through either formal or informal procedures. 2 The theories of
uncertainty employed in such settings are as pragmatic as the
stories advocated in the closing arguments of trial attorneys. But
unlike the ad hoc theories of uncertainty often found in judicial
proceedings, theories of uncertainty in administrative proceedings
can be more generic and explicit, with administrative regulations
or policies specifying the default inferences to be drawn from a
type of evidence.30 The rules allocating burdens of proof also play
28 On the role of stories in litigation, see, for example, Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 604 (1994), and Ronald J. Allen,
The Nature of JuridicalProof,13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991).
29 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-57 (2000).
30 See, e.g., Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Transscience Organization":Scientific Uncertainty,Science Policy, and Factfindingin the Growth
Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 258-67 (1998) (discussing the nature of
"science policies" adopted by administrative agencies, and giving examples of science
policies adopted by the U.S. EPA for use in assessing the carcinogenic risk to humans
posed by chemical agents).
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a dominant role in administrative factfinding, as they do in judicial
proceedings.3'
The next two Parts of this Article discuss two examples of
theories of uncertainty. The first is generic and oriented toward
types of evidence, while the second lays out a general mode of
analysis and applies it to descriptions of the evidence from a
particular criminal trial. The first example, discussed in Part II, is
a theory useful in evaluating any inferences warranted by scientific
evidence, such as inferences about generic causation. Inferences
about generic causation are crucial, for example, in tort cases and
in administrative proceedings dealing with health, safety, and the
environment.
The second example, discussed in Part III,
illustrates a method for analyzing inferences about unique,
historical events-inferences central in most criminal and civil
adjudications. The discussions of these two examples also explore
additional aspects of any theory of uncertainty.
II.

A THEORY OF UNCERTAINTY FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
ABOUT GENERIC CAUSATION

This Part of the Article outlines a general theory of
uncertainty, the details of which are presented elsewhere. 32 This
theory explains the types of uncertainty inherent in inferences
from scientific evidence to findings about generic causation.
Assertions about generic causation state causal relationships
among types of events, but not directly about specific events. For
example, such a proposition might state that a certain type or level
of exposure to a particular chemical compound can cause harmful
neurological effects in humans.33
Generic causation is
distinguishable from specific causation. An example of specific
causation is whether a particular effect (such as the illness of a
particular plaintiff) was caused by a particular event (perhaps the
plaintiff's exposure to a particular toxic agent). In a toxic tort
case, a plaintiff must prove both generic and specific causation,

31 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), supplemental
opinion (1977), cert. denied sub nom., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. EPA, 431 U.S. 925 (1977)
(deciding burden of proof in administrative proceedings to suspend pesticide
registrations).
32 The basic theory has been presented in detail in Vern R. Walker; The Siren Songs of
Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 567 (1991) [hereinafter Walker, Siren Songs]. The theory has been applied to
explain determinations of baseline risk in tort law. See Vern R. Walker, The Concept of
Baseline Risk in Tort Litigation, 80 KY. L.J. 631, 647-72 (1991-92) [hereinafter Walker,
Baseline Risk].
33 A proposition about generic causation can be either affirmative or negative-that is,
it can either assert or deny generic causation.
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while generic causation alone might be a sufficient legal basis for a
protective health or safety regulation.
The theory of uncertainty discussed here takes into account
the linguistic, logical, and causal dimensions of propositions about
generic causation. The theory classifies types of uncertainty and
explains why those types of: uncertainty are inherent in each
proposition about generic causation, at least when that proposition
is warranted by data and analysis using standard scientific method.
In each category of uncertainty, the central question is how error
can arise in the inference from scientific data to a conclusion about
generic causation. An ancillary question is how the extent of
possible error can be characterized. The goal may be to reduce the
amount of uncertainty and to understand the extent of residual
uncertainty. This discussion has two parts: the first section
enumerates the six types of uncertainty recognized in the theory,
and the second section discusses how the theory might be useful in
warranting nonmonotonic inferences in legal factfinding.
A. Types of Inherent Uncertainty
The theory classifies uncertainties into six types or categories:
concept uncertainty, measurement uncertainty, calculation
uncertainty, sampling uncertainty, mathematical modeling
uncertainty, and causal uncertainty. Each type of uncertainty
arises at a distinct step in the scientific process of warranting a
conclusion about generic causation and adds a new possibility of
error. In the end, after the process of scientific warranting is
complete, there is inherent in the conclusion a residual degree of
uncertainty of each type. The types are therefore logically distinct,
generally cumulative, and probably inherent in any such finding.
1.

Concept Uncertainty

Propositions about generic causation use nouns, verbs, and
their qualifiers to conceptualize and categorize events in the world.
The proposition "inhaling air containing high concentrations of
benzene can cause leukemia in people" uses numerous concepts to
identify and relate two types of events: certain inhalation events
and the development of leukemia. Whenever we select particular
concepts to use in identifying and describing events, we place a
conceptual structure on the world and limit the way in which we
conceptualize those events. For example, a human life is
immensely
complicated,
with
genetic,
developmental,
environmental, psychological, and social factors. The proposition
above refers only to certain inhalation events and a certain health
outcome. But the same events could be described in an infinite
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number of ways. The event described as "inhaling benzene" might
involve inhaling hundreds of other chemicals as well. We can also
think of it as an "exposure-to-benzene event," not just an
inhalation event, and thereby classify it together with ingestions of
benzene, dermal contacts with benzene, and other inhalations of
benzene. The same time-slice of a person's life might be described
not as a benzene exposure event at all, but (for example) as an
event of being within one hundred meters of a high-voltage
alternating current transmission line.
Scientists call descriptive concepts "variables," which they use
to classify objects or events for purposes of scientific study. A
variable might be a property that varies from individual to
individual, such as height or weight. The primary logical function
of a variable or concept is to provide a set of categories with which
to classify individual objects or events. The variable "color" might
be given the classification categories of "red," "blue," "green," and
so forth. A scientist conducting a study gives each individual
subject of the study a "score," reflecting the category in which the
individual is classified. The scores of all the subjects in the study
constitute the "data" for that study. There are very few
constraints on inventing variables and classification categories.
The primary criterion is pragmatic: they should produce
measurements (data) that will be useful for some purpose.
Suppose, for example, there is an occupational health study of
benzene exposure and leukemia. One variable in the study might
be benzene inhalation. In order to gather exposure data, air
samples would be taken in the workplace and their benzene
content analyzed. Each air sample would receive a score on the
variable "benzene concentration." Depending upon the goals of
the study, this variable might consist of classification categories in
three different types.34 Nominal or qualitative categories are
merely distinguishable from each other (air samples might be
scored simply as testing positive for benzene or not). Ordinal or
comparative categories have a ranking among themselves, often
based on degree of the property being measured-for example,
"contains less benzene than the reference sample," "contains the
same amount of benzene as the reference sample," and "contains
more benzene than the reference sample." Scalar or completely
quantitative categories are not only distinguishable and rank-

34

For discussions of types of measurement variables, see EDWIN E. GHISELLI ET AL.,

MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1981); HERMAN J.
LOETHER & DONALD G. MCTAVISH, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS: AN

INTRODUCTION 16-24 (4th ed. 1993).
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ordered, but also related by a unit of measure, such as "contains
one part benzene per million parts of air."
Investigators are free to select the variables and design the
classification categories of those variables. But once investigators
select the study variables and the category structures of those
variables, and once they gather data using those variables, any
causal conclusions drawn from the study are open to question
about whether different variables or category structures would
have produced different results. The uncertainty created by the
selection of variables is "concept uncertainty." Concept
uncertainty is the potential for error created by conceptualizing
the world in one way and not others. It is the uncertainty created
by using any particular concepts to describe the world. The
selection of variables certainly results in a lack of knowledge about
variables not studied, but can also cause inferential error about
those variables that are studied.35 Selection of variables can be a
source of inferential error in nonmonotonic inferences.
Scientists often anticipate and try to minimize unnecessary
concept uncertainty when they design the variables they will use.
For example, in the benzene occupational health example, there
are advantages to using scalar variables, instead of nominal or
ordinal variables, to gather air data. First, scalar data provides
more information and warrants more conclusions. Scalar data will
warrant both nominal and ordinal conclusions, but nominal or
ordinal data will not warrant the kind of quantitative conclusion
that scalar data will warrant. Second, the state of knowledge about
benzene is at a point where scalar data are needed. When the first
data are gathered about the potential toxicity of an environmental
agent, qualitative case reports about acute incidents may be the
only kind of information available. This state of knowledge makes
purely qualitative information valuable. As the knowledge base
grows, however, only more informative data make significant
contributions to it. Third, the technology for generating scalar
analyses of benzene air concentrations has improved over time to
the point where the cost of gathering scalar data may be
outweighed by the benefits of doing SO. 3 6 Even with lower costs of
See infra.text accompanying note 48.
This may be true about many studies of generic causation conducted within wealthy
nations, but each decision to undertake a study to resolve uncertainty occurs within a
particular socioeconomic context. The same studies might not be undertaken in a
developing country, where scarce economic or occupational health resources might be put
to better use. Fortunately, information about generic toxicity is often applicable to many
circumstances around the globe, and such studies do not need to be replicated within each
culture. Behavioral studies, on the other hand, might be far more culture specific.
Another example where a study might not be economically feasible, even in a
35

36

2001]

THEORIES OF UNCERTAINTY

1547

generating data, however, those costs must be weighed against the
expected benefits from a particular study design. The kinds and
degrees of uncertainty expected to be inherent in the study results
must be weighed in that decision. However, it is clear that once
data have been gathered employing certain variables, there are
limits on the kinds of conclusions that the study can warrant.
2. Measurement Uncertainty
Measurement is the process of classifying individual objects or
events into the categories of a variable, and it generates the data
for a scientific study. Measuring creates the potential for
misclassification. Measurement error can lead to inaccurate
conclusions, not only about the particular individual that is
misclassified, but also about the groups of individuals under study.
Misclassifying an event as "inhalation of benzene" can be viewed
either as a mistake in measurement or a mistake in description.
From a linguistic standpoint, measurement error is simply an error
in predication or description. From a scientific perspective,
mistakes in describing a particular object or event are often
misclassification or measurement errors.37
When the goal is to reach warranted generic conclusions
about the groups of individuals under study, it is often
epistemically useful to classify measurement uncertainty into
reliability problems and validity problems.
Such problems
manifest themselves in either random or systemic error. A
measurement process (as well as the resulting data) is said to be
"unreliable" to the extent that repeated measurements of the same
object or event by the same measurement process would yield
inconsistent results in a random fashion.38 If we were to measure
or classify the same individual repeatedly, using an unreliable
process, we would classify the individual into different categories
of the variable, but in a random pattern. For example, analyses of
wealthy nation, is in the context of a private lawsuit. If plaintiffs would have to finance a
study that has variables tailored to the particular lawsuit, the private parties might not
have the resources to do so, even assuming that such a study would be methodologically
feasible. Hence, it is frequently a question in toxic tort or products liability litigation
whether the studies available in the public domain are sufficient to warrant factfinding in a
particular case. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (upholding the
district court's exclusion from evidence of expert testimony based on animal and
epidemiologic studies, where issue of fact was causation in a human being).
37 Not all descriptive inaccuracies are measurement errors, however. Propositions that
inaccurately describe a generic causal relation may have sources of error other than
measurement error. Sufficient measurement accuracy is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for warranting descriptive accuracy.
38 See EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
ASSESSMENT 13 (1979); GHISELLI ET AL., supra note 34, at 184, 191.
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the same air sample by a certain laboratory process might yield
different results for the concentration of benzene in parts per
million, but all those results might fall in a random pattern and
largely within one percent of the mean value.
For many
measurement processes, especially in the physical sciences, we can
conduct reliability studies to determine distributions of error
under different sets of circumstances. In the behavioral sciences,
however, the feasibility of retesting the same individual is
especially difficult, since the measurement process itself might
change the behavior of the subject individuals.
Retaking
standardized exams, for example, might produce higher scores
simply because taking the exam educates the individual in examtaking skills. Despite such methodological problems with certain
types of subjects, scientists still employ a fairly clear notion of
measurement unreliability, in which the source of error is due to
random variations in the measurement process itself.
It may be epistemically useful to identify the extent of random
variability within measurement data. If it is possible to take a
large number of repeated measurements of the same, unchanged
individual, we might find that the data vary in a random pattern
that suggests many minor causes at work producing the results. It
may be possible to reduce this "noise" through changing the
technology or measurement methods. If we can reduce the range
of random variation in measurements, we increase the "precision"
of the measurements.39 Another method for reducing the random
error in inferences based on measurements is to take many
measurements and use statistical techniques to derive a mean
value from the data. Under certain conditions, statistical theory
warrants ascribing less uncertainty to the mean than to a single
measurement."
Therefore, this combination of techniques for
increasing measurement precision and reducing measurement
uncertainty may warrant a conclusion about the "true
measurement value" that has less uncertainty than a conclusion
based simply on a single act of measurement. This approach to
reducing measurement uncertainty is warranted if the
measurement error varies randomly.
Even if we develop a perfectly reliable measurement process
that would yield the same classification for the same individual
every time the process is repeated, however, we could still have
uncertainty about measurement validity. A measurement process
is valid to the extent that it measures exactly what we think it
39

See, e.g., Theodore Peters & James 0. Westgard, Evaluation of Methods, in

TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 410,412 (Norbert W. Tietz ed., 1986).
40 See, e.g., DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 90-97 (2d ed. 1991).
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measures.' 1 Measurement invalidity occurs when an individual is
placed in the wrong category of the variable, even if this is done
consistently. Validity problems are external questions about the
adequacy of our measurement process relative to alternative
measures of the same variable. If, for example, there is a
"criterion method" or "reference method" that can serve as a
standard for evaluating certain measurements (such as measuring
benzene in air), then a new technology or process for measuring
the same variable should be tested for validity against the criterion
method.42 To the extent that we obtain inconsistent results from
two different but reliable methods when they are applied to the
same individuals, we have identified a validity problem with one
method or the other. While reliability is a matter of internal
consistency (using the same method, same subjects), validity is a
matter of external consistency (different methods, same subjects).
Both kinds of measurement uncertainty are about the possible
errors introduced by the measurement process, not about true
variations in the individuals being measured.
Two different measurement methods that are used to classify
the same individuals on the same variable may yield systematically
different results. For example, one method may overestimate the
benzene concentrations, compared to the other method. Known
systematic error allows a different kind of remedy than random
error does. If the data have a known bias in some direction, one
remedy might be to adjust for that bias in reaching conclusions
based on those results. If, for example, we know that one
measurement process tends to overestimate by. ten percent, we
might reduce the uncertainty in our inferences by discounting for
that systematic error. Watches that gain a minute every hour can
be useful in telling time, provided the user employs a suitable
calculation to adjust for this bias. Of course, there may also be
technological remedies that are feasible and economically
worthwhile.
For a theory of uncertainty about conclusions that are based
on a measurement process, it would be useful to distinguish
reliability problems from validity problems, and random
inconsistencies from systematic inconsistencies. The epistemic
implications and remedies probably differ depending upon the
type of measurement uncertainty involved. ' Scientists generally
take great care to identify the kinds and sources of measurement
error, to reduce the potential for measurement error to tolerable
41

266.
42

See CARMINES & ZELLER, supra note 38, at 12; GHISELLI ET AL., supra note 34, at
See, e.g., Peters & Westgard, supranote 39, at 412.
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levels, and to characterize the extent of residual measurement
uncertainty within a set of data. Without any appreciation of the
extent of measurement uncertainty in the data, we cannot
appreciate the epistemic constraints on the inferences warranted
by that data.
3. Calculation Uncertainty
When scientists record data, manipulate symbols within data
bases, calculate statistics from data, and so forth, there is the
potential for performing the procedure incorrectly. Such mistakes
can produce errors in the conclusions that are drawn from the
data. This source of uncertainty is all too familiar from elementary
school drills in arithmetic and spelling, and is so well appreciated
that it might be overlooked as a distinct type of uncertainty. But
conducting even basic arithmetic operations can provide an
illustration of how we use theories of uncertainty to help warrant
conclusions. We devise theories of uncertainty, for example, when
we try to balance a checkbook and resolve an inconsistency
between our calculated balance and the bank's calculated balance.
Even if we and the bank have entered all check amounts correctly,
with no measurement errors, we or the bank might have made a
calculation error in adding or subtracting. The complexity of the
theory of uncertainty we use to guide our investigation into the
source of the inconsistency depends upon the amounts of money at
stake, the number of withdrawal or deposit items involved, and the
amount of time we wish to devote to the task. We might decide
that it is highly unlikely that the bank's computer made a purely
computational error and check only that withdrawal and deposit
items are in agreement. Or we could, if we wish, check every
aspect of our and the bank's calculations. Of course, we might also
decide at the outset that minor inconsistencies of a few cents are
not worth investigating at all. If we accept the bank's balance as
our own, we eliminate the need for theories of uncertainty
altogether. But if the inconsistency is not acceptable, then the
hunt for its causes will be more efficient if it is guided by a theory
of uncertainty.
4. Sampling Uncertainty
Scientific data record actual measurements taken on
particular objects or events. We often want to generalize beyond
the past measurements, however, and warrant generic conclusions
about objects or events as yet unmeasured. Scientists distinguish
between the sample (the individuals measured or the data
gathered from measuring them) and the population (the group to
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be the subject of the conclusion). Making an inference from
sample data, or from the descriptive statistics summarizing that
data, to conclusions about populations creates the possibility that
error will be introduced because the sample does not adequately
represent the population. The epistemic challenge is to warrant a
conclusion about a population on the basis of evidence that is
descriptive merely of a sample.
Scientists help establish the needed warrant by the methods
they use to draw the sample and analyze the data. First, the
sample must be drawn in such a way that we can assign a
probability to drawing a sample with the same or similar statistics
merely by chance. Ideally, the study would be designed so that a
probability distribution could be determined for all important
statistical results in samples of a given size. For example, if the
population contains 60% men and 40% women, there is a certain
probability of randomly drawing a sample of 200 people in which
there would be 102 men and 98 women. If the population contains
58% men and 42% women, there is a probability of randomly
drawing a sample of 103. people consisting of 40 men and 63
women. A sample for which such probability determinations are
warranted is a "probability sample."43 The warrant for assigning a
probability to a type of sample is based upon the procedure used
to draw the sample, the nature of the relevant variable, and the
For example, a simple
nature of the subject individuals.
randomizing procedure for drawing the sample might alone
provide sufficient warrant for assigning probabilities to sample
results, but an occupational health study might also rely on the
typicality of the biological processes being studied and on the
representativeness of the human subjects involved. Regardless of
the precise basis and reasoning, what must be warranted is the
probability of obtaining samples with the relevant statistical
compositions.
Second, once a sample has been drawn in such a way that
probabilities can be assigned to drawing the relevant results, those
probabilities and results can help warrant conclusions about the
population. For example, suppose a simple random sample
contains 168 people, consisting of 100 men and 68 women.
Reasoning hypothetically, if the population in fact contains 10%
men and 90% women, then the probability of drawing this sample
is extremely low-so low that this hypothesis about the makeup of
the population is probably false. The warrant for rejecting this
hypothesis about the population as improbable rests on the way
43 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 224-25 (5th ed. 1994).
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the sample was drawn, on the sample results, and on probability
theory itself. Scientists have invented various techniques for
warranting inferences about the population on the basis of a
probability sample. These techniques include hypothesis testing,
significance testing using P-values, confidence intervals, and
statistical power." These are all techniques for characterizing the
extent of the sampling uncertainty inherent in any inferences from
sample to population. They help characterize the potential for
error that is created by the fact that the empirical evidence is
limited to sample data. Such techniques cannot eliminate the
possibility of sampling error, but they can inform our judgments
about populations.
From a linguistic and logical perspective, sampling uncertainty
is inherent not only in propositions expressly about statistical
characteristics of groups, but also in many propositions that are
not explicitly quantitative at all. In English, there are many ways
to express what logicians call "quantification." Examples are:
''almost all birds can fly," "most parents love their children,"
"children need nurturing," and "some cases of leukemia in
workers are caused by inhaling air containing benzene." From the
standpoint of logical analysis, such propositions combine a
reference to some quantity of a subject group identified by a
variable, with a predication of a second variable. Words such as
"'some," "many," "almost all," and "all" identify some portion of a
group ("birds," "parents," "children," or "cases of leukemia"), and
the proposition predicates something as true of that portion, such
as "being able to fly." In other words, the subject-predicate
structure of the proposition classifies some quantity of individuals
into the categories of two different variables. The first example
asserts that almost everything classified as a bird is also able to fly,
and it may also assert that there are in fact such things that are
both birds and able to fly. Unless propositions with quantified
classes are warranted by complete enumeration, they are
susceptible to sampling uncertainty. The concept of sampling
uncertainty developed in science is also useful in analyzing
epistemic problems in ordinary generalizations about the world.
The scientific approach to sampling uncertainty provides an
excellent example of the causal dimension of a theory of
uncertainty. Sampling uncertainty poses an epistemic problem for
nonmonotonic inferences from sample results to generalizations
about a population. There are data available on the individuals in
the sample, but there is incomplete information about all the
44 See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE & DAVID A. FREEDMAN, Reference Guide on Statistics,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 373-93 (1994).
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individuals in the population. What helps warrant an inference
about the population is a causal account of how the sample was
drawn from that population. If the causal process of drawing a
particular subset of individuals was sufficiently random and
unbiased, it can help warrant the assignment of probabilities to
types of sample results. Without such a sampling process, the
remainder of the scientific reasoning is itself unwarranted. The
reasoning is warranted in critical part by the causal process by
which the sample was selected.
5. Mathematical Modeling Uncertainty
In ordinary language there are a variety of ways to combine
two or more concepts into a single thought. Nouns name groups of
individuals that are identifiable by common characteristics
("workers"), and nouns can be linked by prepositions ("workers in
the company"), verbs ("workers quit the company"), or mere
juxtaposition ("company workers"). Adjectives can narrow the
group named by the noun to the subgroup identified by the
adjective ("full-time workers"). Verbs similarly designate groups
of events, such as "inhaling air containing benzene." There are a
variety of grammatical structures in English for expressing
complex concepts and propositions.
Scientists express their conclusions in ordinary language. But
they also want to provide scientific warrant for those conclusions,
based on data generated and analyzed according to acceptable
scientific methods. In order to warrant conclusions using multiple
concepts, scientists must combine data that are gathered on
multiple variables. A common scientific paradigm for doing so is
the use of mathematical models, such as the quantitative methods
of statistics for multivariate analysis. I have elsewhere discussed
two important types of mathematical models: relative risk models
for nominal data and linear regression models for scalar data.45
Mathematical models characterize quantitative relationships
between sets of data on two or more different variables. They also
can be used to predict values for one variable based on values for
other variables.
Even a very simple mathematical model will illustrate the
nature of the uncertainty that use of such models introduces. If a
45 See Walker, Siren Songs, supra note 32, at 598-608 (discussing linear regression
models); Walker, Baseline Risk, supra note 32, at 651-62 (discussing relative risk model);
see also Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 44, at 147-56 (discussing relative risk and
odds ratio in epidemiologic studies); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple
Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 44, at 415-69.
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particular watch "runs fast" but is the only available means for
determining the time of day, we can still use it to determine the
time if we use the right mathematical model. If, for example, the
watch gains approximately two minutes per hour, then the
algorithm would be to multiply two minutes by the number of
hours since the watch was last set, and subtract that product from
the time shown on the watch. This watch and this mathematical
model, used together, might warrant predictions about time of day,
as validated by other watches. This mathematical formula,
however, might be the wrong model for two reasons-either
because "two minutes" is not the correct amount to use in the
multiplication or because the form of the model is incorrect. As an
example of the first error, the correct constant might not be two
minutes, but rather 105 seconds.46 As an example of the second
error, the correct formula might not be adding a constant number
of seconds for each passing hour, but rather multiplying the
duration of the previous hour cycle by 1.02. In the latter case, the
incremental error in minutes per hour is not constant, but
increases over time. When scientists use mathematical models to
predict values or statistics on one variable from the value or
statistics on other variables, they create a potential for error due to
the mathematical models they choose to employ.
6. Causal Uncertainty
Even when sound mathematical analysis shows that there are
quantitative associations among variables or data, there is a
potential for error in asserting the existence of any underlying
causation for this phenomenon. Two types of events can occur
together without one causing the other. 7 Even when one type of
event is a reliable predictor of the other, that event may have
dubious explanatory value. If, for example, a standardized test
score is a good predictor of success in academic courses, the
standardized test does not cause that success. Any causal account
of the statistical association itself, or of either variable in isolation,
46 The formula used in the mathematical model is correct, but what is incorrect is the
value assigned to a constant in that formula.
47 In addition, even when no regular concurrence has been observed, there may be
underlying causation involved, as when some third type of event counteracts or masks the
otherwise causal action. See JAMES A. DAVIS, THE LOGIC OF CAUSAL ORDER 24-27
(1985); Bailey et al., supra note 45, at 157-70. For example, the complexities of human
metabolism often make it very difficult to determine what is causing what within the
human body. The design of a controlled experiment is intended to create a situation in
which a statistically significant difference between the test group and the control group
would warrant an inference of causation. Controlled laboratory experiments are not
always feasible, however. The world of events is so complicated that without controlled
experiments, conclusions about causal action are often difficult to warrant.
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can be quite complicated and may be largely unavailable. Causal
action is a means of explaining why events occur, as well as
explaining the similarities and differences between those events.
Causal accounts explain the data, not merely predict it.
and
sampling,
calculation,
Even if measurement,
mathematical modeling uncertainties could be eliminated, any
causal interpretation would still incur causal uncertainty. A causal
explanation can introduce causal error in various ways. First,
there may be a real statistical association between events of type A
and events of type B, but A might cause B, B might cause A, there
may be interactive causality between A and B, events of type C
might cause both A and B, and so on. One result of concept
uncertainty-gathering data on selected variables and not othersis that variables are ignored and causal accounts may therefore
become inaccurate.8 Perhaps causal concepts themselves would
be more useful if they were defined probabilistically and
quantitatively, not merely qualitatively.49 Statistical associations
among sampling data may warrant a conclusion or finding about
generic causation, but that conclusion has an inherent risk of
causal error.
B. Evaluation of the Theory as a Theory of Uncertainty
This theory of uncertainty states that each proposition about
generic causation that is warranted by scientific data is susceptible
to six possible types of error. Each of these six types of
uncertainty is logically distinct from the others, and the potential
for error is cumulative from each type of uncertainty to the next.
In the end, every causal conclusion probably has inherent in it a
residual amount of each kind of uncertainty. In any particular
instance of legal factfinding, the decision to be made by the
factfinder is whether those kinds and residual degrees of
uncertainty are tolerable for the purposes of the legal proceeding.
The theory of uncertainty discussed here can help a factfinder to
analyze which kinds of uncertainty are present in what degree, to
perform a cost/benefit analysis for actions to reduce those
uncertainties, and to decide which uncertainties are tolerable
under the circumstances. For example, if a scientific study appears
to warrant the proposition "inhalation of benzene can cause cancer
in a human being," then this theory of uncertainty explains the
ways in which this proposition could still be false, 'despite the

48 See supra text accompanying note 35.
49 See, e.g., GLENN SHAFER, THE ART OF CAUSAL CONJECTURE 91-111, 299-357

(1996).
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study. The theory explains the types of uncertainty that would be
associated with such a finding.
The theory could also help explain which kinds of evidence
are relevant, and help characterize the cumulative uncertainty in
an inference based on the available evidence. The theory could
explain what evidence is missing and why that type of evidence is
important. It would also suggest what a complete set of scientific
evidence would contain. A factfinder could use this theory of
uncertainty to guide an epistemic evaluation of the available and
missing evidence.
A theory of uncertainty should be useful in evaluating the
warrant for inferences in a particular pragmatic context. No
theory of uncertainty is likely to incorporate complete linguistic,
logical, and causal accounts of any particular inference.
Nevertheless, the theory discussed above draws attention to
certain linguistic, logical, and causal dimensions of warrant that are
generally applicable. For example, the theory provides a way of
thinking about the semantics of English sentences-by analyzing
predication as a process of classifying individual objects or events
into the categories of a variable and by analyzing variables as
having nominal, ordinal, or scalar classification categories." Such
a theory would prompt questions about the criteria for describing
something (concept and measurement uncertainty) or for
generalizing from observed instances to larger groups (as often
occurs in propositions or predications). By anchoring the analysis
of uncertainty in a semantics of linguistic expressions, the theory
becomes useful in analyzing many findings, whether they are
explicitly scientific or not. The theory ties the causal language of a
finding to the kinds of uncertainty likely to underlie such a finding.
This theory of uncertainty also claims that the different types
of uncertainty are logically distinct and that the potential for error
is cumulative. This hypothesis about logical independence could
be a fruitful heuristic, even if we were to find in a particular case
that some types of uncertainty are not entirely independent of the
others.
Moreover, even if the types of uncertainty are
independent and cumulative, the theory undermines the notion
that uncertainties are simply additive, or even that they can be
characterized collectively by a single quantitative measure. That
is, the incremental uncertainties cannot be simply added into a
single sum. In a particular case, measurement errors could have
complicated effects on sampling errors or mathematical modeling
errors. "Sensitivity analyses" are usually needed to determine and
50 See supra Part II.A.1.

2001]

THEORIES OF UNCERTAINTY

1557

characterize the complicated interactive effects among various
types of possible error within a model, and the effects of those
errors on the conclusion to be warranted. 1 Indeed, the theory
suggests that while certain types of uncertainty may be
characterized quantitatively (such as measurement reliability,
sampling uncertainty, and mathematical modeling uncertainty),
other types are unlikely candidates for quantitative treatment
(such as concept uncertainty, some measurement validity, and
causal uncertainties). The theory provides a good reason to reject
the notion, popular among theorists, that all of the uncertainties
inherent in a finding could be characterized by a single
probability. 2
The theory also integrates a causal dimension by showing why
causal theories are needed to help warrant inferences of generic
causation. For example, part of the scientific warrant for a
conclusion about causation is that the data resulted from a study in
which the sampling and measurement processes were well
designed and well executed. If in such a study the incidence of
disease in the test group (exposed group) is higher than the
incidence in the control or comparison group, and if the difference
in rates is unlikely to be due to chance, this may warrant the
conclusion that the exposure probably caused the increase in
disease in the test group. The warrant for this conclusion,
however, is strong only if the sampling design and measurement
methods make any alternative causal account less probable.
Therefore, the causal account of how the study was conducted is
an essential part of the warrant for the conclusion. This theory of
uncertainty integrates the causal, linguistic, and logical dimensions
of scientific inference to produce an explanation of the possible
sources of error in a finding.
This theory of uncertainty should also have explanatory uses
outside the narrow class of propositions about generic causation
warranted by scientific data. Many of the generalizations used in
everyday inferences are not warranted by scientific studies, but are
warranted, if at all, by personal experiences. .Such everyday
generalizations are prone to error in the same ways that scientific
inferences are. Uncertainties in everyday generalizations can arise
from concept definition and classification error, inaccurate
summarization and nonrepresentative samples, -or flawed
predictive models and unwarranted causal hypotheses. In Part III
51 See, e.g., M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY 39 (1990)
("Sensitivity analysis is the computation of the effect of changes in input values or
assumptions (including boundaries and model functional form) on the outputs.").
52 See discussion of Schum's theory infra Part III.
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of this Article, I discuss some examples, such as "police officers do
not usually lie when testifying under oath." We often employ such
generalizations to warrant inferences, and in the face of
inconsistent conclusions we develop theories of uncertainty about
how such a generalization might be inaccurate. The theory of
uncertainty considered above should provide a useful analysis for
such nonscientific generalizations as well.
This theory of uncertainty can also help resolve the problems
surtounding admissibility standards for scientific opinions in
judicial proceedings-the issue addressed by the U.S. Supreme
5 3 and Joiner." First, the theory shows a method
Court in Daubert
for analyzing the uncertainties underlying scientific warrant. It
summarizes part of what is meant by the adjective "scientific," and
does so in a way that explains why the use of scientific method
should provide a sufficient condition for admitting an expert
opinion. That is, it can guide the epistemic analysis required by
Daubert. What the theory does not answer is the pragmatic
question of what level of uncertainty is tolerable for judicial
purposes.5 How to manage the risk of error in judicial factfinding
is ultimately a decision of judicial management. However, a useful
theory of uncertainty can help characterize the uncertainty
inherent in such findings.
One critical question of judicial management is how to
allocate factfinding roles between judge and jury. Rulings on the
admissibility and legal sufficiency of evidence are traditional
devices by which judges can take the factfinding function away
from juries, in light of the proffered or admissible evidence in the
particular case. 6 The theory of uncertainty above may help to
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
55 In Daubert, the Supreme Court used the phrase "evidentiary reliability" to indicate
a legal concept. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-92. That concept probably should include the
pragmatic assessment that the evidence under scrutiny is "reliable enough" or
"trustworthy enough" for judicial purposes, when the legal problem being addressed is
admissibility. This pragmatic assessment goes much further than the scientific concept of
"measurement reliability," or even "measurement validity," discussed supra Part II.A.2.
See id. at 590 n.9. These scientific concepts are useful to scientists because they allow
assessments of measurement techniques divorced from the pragmatic question of whether
those techniques are reliable enough or valid enough for a particular purpose. By
contrast, the legal concept of evidentiary reliability probably includes a judgment about
whether the residual inconsistencies (if any) between inferences drawn by experts based
on the proffered evidence are tolerable for purposes of the admissibility decision. On this
reading, what experts are expected to provide federal judges in a Daubert hearing are
theories of uncertainty tailored to the proffered evidence and the findings at issue in the
particular legal case. The point of contention between proponents and opponents of the
evidence is what the residual uncertainties are and whether they should be tolerated
within the body of evidence admitted into the case.
56 See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 357-409 (4th ed. 1992).
53

54
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draw a more principled line between judge and jury, at least when
it comes to the role of scientific expert opinion in factfinding. The
Daubertand Joinerdecisions underscore the "gatekeeping" role of
the judge in requiring proffered expert opinions to pass scientific
muster. To the extent that scientific warrant and the warrant for
ordinary generalizations are epistemically congruent, there is no
conceptual gap between the gatekeeping task and the broader role
of the judge in policing the boundaries of reasonable jury
deliberation. Despite the difficulties and inefficiencies in requiring
an expert to explain the scientific warrant for his or her opinion
first to a generalist judge and then to a jury, there may be clear
epistemic benefits to requiring some expert witnesses to undergo
that dual exercise. Moreover, if the theory of uncertainty
discussed above can be used to draw reasonable boundaries
around the scope of a Daubertinquiry, it can help control the trial
court's discretion in ruling on admissibility. Similar things can be
said for rulings on legal sufficiency of evidence and the need for
expert testimony to support a finding of fact. When assessing the
epistemic merits of such legal rules, a useful theory of uncertainty
should be of considerable value.
III.

A THEORY OF UNCERTAINTY FOR EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

ABOUT PARTICULAR EVENTS

In his work on Wigmorean inference networks, David Schum
has developed the notion of "decomposing" an inference from
initial evidence to ultimate conclusion. Schum's method of
decomposition is not only general in form, but also applicable to
inferences about the occurrence of specific historical events. For
example, eyewitness W might testify at trial that some particular
event E occurred at time t in the past (such as "Sacco was present
at the scene at the time the crime occurred"). Witness W might
claim to know that E occurred at t because W was present at the
time and witnessed the event. A factfinder listening to this
testimony may try to determine whether it is true that E occurred
at t. The available evidence is, in part, W's testimony at the trial.
The inference from such evidence to a finding about E's
occurrence is undoubtedly nonmonotonic: the evidence is
incomplete and the conclusion is not certain. The question in this
Article is how an adequate theory of uncertainty could help
warrant such a nonmonotonic inference. In this section, I set out
Schum's theory of decomposition, with particular attention to its
features as a theory of uncertainty. In the second section, I briefly
discuss several limitations of Schum's theory, again solely from the
standpoint of its treatment of uncertainty.
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A. Schum's Account of Inference Decomposition
Schum suggests that a factfinder faced with determining
whether event E actually occurred might "decompose" the
ultimate inference from W's testimony to a conclusion about
E
57
into a chain of intermediate inferences about, for example:
(a) W's veracity (if W is in fact remembering, at the time
of trial, that E occurred at t, whether W is testifying in
accord with this present memory or whether W is
lying); and
(3) W's memory (if W believed at t, contemporaneously
with the alleged event, that E was occurring, whether
W's memory at trial is in accord with that earlier
belief or whether W's memory is faulty); and
(y) W's observationalsensitivity and objectivity (whether
W's belief at t, contemporaneous with event E, was in
accord with what was actually occurring at that time
in W's perceptual environment, or whether W was
mistaken in what he thought he saw).
This chain of inferences is charted according to Schum's method in
Figure 1. In Schum's terminology, the "probative force" of W's
testimony at trial with respect to the conclusion that event E
occurred at t should be, at least in part, a function of W's veracity,
memory, objectivity, and observational sensitivity. At a minimum,
W's testimony is strong evidence that E occurred (in the way that
W describes it) only if (y) W perceived E correctly, (P) W
accurately remembers his past perception, and (a) W is telling the
truth about what he remembers. To the extent that any of these
three conditions is not met, the probative value of W's testimony
diminishes accordingly.
Schum characterizes inference chain decomposition as making
explicit the sources of uncertainty within the ultimate inference. 8
For each step identified in the chain, Schum thinks that "we have
to make an assertion about what we believe provides the ground
for or gives us license to take each one of these steps." 9 Schum
calls such an assertion a "generalization," because it is an assertion
"about what happens in general.'
He gives a number of
57 See SCHUM, supranote 14, at 100-09; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 53-60.
58 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 2, 77, 109, 138; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at

71,76.
59 SCHUM, supra note 14, at 81-82, 472 (stating "generalizations are required");
KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 88-89 ("[B]ehind every arc or link in a chain of
reasoning, there must reside an appropriate generalization that licenses the probabilistic
inferential step at this arc.").
60 SCHUM, supra note 14, at 82. At one point, Schum suggests that the term
"generalization" is synonymous in this context with "warrant." Id. at 81. This is not the
meaning given to "warrant" in this Article. In my use, "warrant" is the account or
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examples, such as "If a person's senses provide evidence of an
event, then this event (usually, often, frequently, etc.) has
occurred. ' 61 A generalization contains some qualifier or "hedge"
about the proposition being asserted-hedges such as
"sometimes," "frequently," "often," "very often," or "usually. "62

O

EITHER EVENT E OCCURRED AT
TIME t, OR E DID NOT
OBSERVATIONAL
SENSITIVITY AND
OBJECTIVITY OF W

O

AT t, W BELIEVED THAT E
OCCURRED, OR W DID NOT
MEMORY

OF W

t

Q

AT TRIAL, W REMEMBERED
THAT E OCCURRED, OR W DID NOT
VERACITY

OF W

T
AT TRIAL, W TESTIFIED
THAT EVENT E OCCURRED

Figure 1
argument, including the evidence, that justifies finding that the conclusion is true or
probably true. "Warrant" as "generalization" would merely refer to a major premise in a
particular kind of warranting argument. When the word "warrant" is used throughout this
Article, however, it has my broader sense, not Schum's narrower meaning.
61 Id. at 102. For additional examples, see id. at 86-92, 101-02, 110-11.
62 Id. at 81-82, 101-02, 110-11. It is not clear whether the hedge term is about
frequency (how often the asserted sequence of events occurs), warrant (how good the
evidential support is), or subjective confidence (how convinced the speaker is). On the
one hand, Schum states that "[w]hich hedge I choose depends upon the strength of my
own belief based upon the experiences I have had in evaluating this kind of evidence." Id.
at 81-82. On the other hand, Schum thinks that the nature of the evidence is important.
He states:
In situations in which our inferences involve replicable processes, we may have
statistical or frequentist backings for these generalizations. In nonreplicable
situations involving singular or unique events, we may either support or weaken
a generalization on the basis of ancillary evidence resulting from a variety of
different tests of these generalizations.
Id. at 210.
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Some generalizations are derived from common sense, while
others require some expertise or background knowledge of a
specific situation.63 Schum states, however, that "[t]here is no
general standard according to which we may grade the plausibility
of generalizations that we may assert." 64
According to Schum, generalizations used in a legal context
are often "asserted in fuzzy terms," using the concept of "fuzzy".
developed by Lotfi Zadeh. 65 A descriptive term is "fuzzy" in this
sense if its meaning is "not crisply defined," if the set of instances
identified by the term is not determined with precision.'
Membership in the set identified by the term is a matter of
degree. 67 Examples of fuzzy sets are "elderly person," "good
eyesight," and "concealed weapon." Even hedge terms employed
in generalizations are often fuzzy. For example, in trying to make
the meaning of "usually" more precise, one person might include
in that concept any relative frequency between 0.5 and 1.0, but
think that the strongest examples are proportions greater than
0.7.68 The meaning given by each user to a fuzzy term can be
modeled as a "membership function" (with values between zero
and 1.0). The membership function expresses the degree to which
the user believes that a particular individual belongs to the "fuzzy
set" identified by the term. 69 For example, I might regard Jones
(age 50) as "old," with a degree of membership of only 0.3 (that is,
I am not inclined to call Jones "old"), while my teenage son clearly
Such
considers Jones to be "old" (membership = 0.95).
"membership functions" assigned to descriptive terms are said to
be "naturally subjective. ' 7° Schum's theory recognizes, therefore,
that some uncertainty in a generalization is due to the vagueness
and ambiguity of the terms used.
The "glue" holding arguments together consists of not only
generalizations, but also "ancillary evidence."71 The relevance of
63 See id. at 91, 472.
64 Id. at 472.
65 Id. at 261-69.

66 Id. at 261-63. Concerning the linguistic and logical dimensions of inferences,
Schum's analysis assumes that linguistic expressions can be found to describe the evidence
accurately and to formulate the conclusions adequately. While there is some discussion of
incorporating Zadeh's fuzzy sets to capture the vagueness in set membership, Schum's
theory provides little insight into the possible sources of error below the propositional
level. In order to use Schum's method in an actual case, it would have to be supplemented
by an account of linguistic meaning and logical structure that clarifies the evidence and
conclusions in that case.
67 See id. at 262.

68 See id. at 263-64 (providing a possible membership function for "usually").
69 See id. at 262.
70 Id. at 264.

71 Id. at 82, 263.

Supporting generalizations with ancillary evidence is especially
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ancillary evidence is to the applicability of a generalization to the
particular instance under consideration." Suppose, for example,
that a police officer named Smith testified to seeing Sacco at the
crime scene, being therefore an instance of witness W above. Even
if I believe, as a generalization, that "police officers testifying
under oath usually tell the truth," I can question whether the
generalization applies in the case of Officer Smith testifying about
Sacco.73 Ancillary evidence relevant to Officer Smith's veracity
might include his demeanor on the witness stand, information
about his motives, his actions in other contexts, and so forth.74
Such ancillary evidence can weigh either for or against the
applicability of the generalization to Officer Smith's testimony.
Schum classifies warranting evidentiary propositions into
three categories: generalizations, ancillary evidence, and directly
relevant evidence. Some evidentiary propositions in a case are
"directly relevant" to the ultimate inference. Evidence is "directly
relevant" if there is a defensible chain of reasoning directly from
the evidence to the conclusion.75 An example is the testimony of
Officer Smith, which is directly relevant to event E. Smith's
testimony, if credible, makes the occurrence of event E more
probable than it would have been without the testimony.76 By
contrast, ancillary evidence is "indirectly relevant," because it
addresses "the strength or weakness of links in chains of reasoning
set up by directly relevant evidence."77 Ancillary evidence
becomes relevant if the probative value of the directly relevant
When the applicability of a
evidence is questionable. 8
generalization to a particular instance is questionable, the ancillary

important in factfinding about unique events. As Kadane and Schum state:
The basis for any defensible probability assessments for singular or unique
events.., is given by the strength of the generalizationwe can assert in defense
of a link together with ancillary evidence that either supports or weakens the
generalization's being applicable in the inference at hand. Absent any ancillary
evidence, our inference at a link would be based only upon an unsupported
generalization. A chain of reasoning based only on unsupported generalizations
cannot be very strong ....
KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 87.
72 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 71, 82, 112-14, 187-92; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note
3, at 85-88.
73See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 82.
74 See id. at 249-50.
75 KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 51.
76 See FED. R. EVID. 401; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 50-52.
77 SCHUM, supra note 14, at 117; see also KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 52-53.
78 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 112, 157-60, 187-91, 207; KADANE & SCHUM, supra

note 3, at 52-53, 85-88.
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evidence might bring in a variety of indirectly relevant factors,
such as Officer Smith's demeanor and motive.79
An important aspect of Schum's theory of uncertainty is his
attempt to quantify the probative value of directly relevant
evidence for an inference, and thereby characterize the degree of
uncertainty associated with that inference. Although there are
various theories for analyzing probative "force," ° Schum devotes
his major attention to the likelihood ratio derived from Bayes'
Theorem. s" I have examined the details of this use of likelihood
ratios elsewhere,82 and my purpose here is merely to assess
Schum's account as a theory of uncertainty. If proposition E*
describes the evidence E* or its content (in the case of testimony)
and the proposition E describes event E, then the likelihood that
E* is true given that E is true can be symbolized as (Prob(E*IE)).11
The likelihood ratio has as its numerator the likelihood
(conditional probability) that the evidence E* would be true if the
event at issue E occurred. The denominator of this ratio is the
likelihood that E* would be true even if the event E did not occur
(Prob(E* INot-E)). The ratio of these two likelihoods expresses
the comparative likelihood of the evidence under these
inconsistent descriptions of the world (E and Not-E). Schum 's
examples describe specific historical evidence and events-such as,
E* = "witness Pelser testified at the trial that he saw Sacco at the
scene of the crime," and E = "Sacco was at the scene of the
crime."' According to Schum's theory, the probative force of the
evidence E* relative to E can be captured by the likelihood ratio
LE. = Prob(E* IE) / Prob(E* Not-E).85 If the likelihood ratio LE. is
greater than one, then the direct evidence increases the odds on E
over Not-E (i.e., the odds that E is true); if LE. is less than one,
then evidence E* decreases those odds; if LE. equals one, then E*
leaves the odds unchanged.86 While the likelihood ratio quantifies
79 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 210, 249-51; see also KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3,
at 85-88. As Schum states: "A generalization is supported to the extent that this
generalization survives our best attempts to show that it is invalid in the particular instance
of concern." SCHUM, supra note 14, at 251.
80 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 200-69; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 150-55.
81 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 213-22, 290-449; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at
121-57, 119-21.
82 See Vern R.Walker, Language, Meaning, and Warrant: An Essay on the Use of
Bayesian ProbabilitySystems in Legal Factfinding, 39 JURIMETRICS 391,397-404 (1999).
83 Formally, the likelihood ratio quantifies the change in odds on a proposition (such
as the ultimate conclusion E) as a new proposition is taken into account (here, the
evidence E*). See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 215-22; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at
124-26.
84 See KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 92, 290 chart 4.
85 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 215-22; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 116-50.
86 See KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 125.
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the probative force of E* for drawing an inference to E, it can be
seen at the same time as reflecting the uncertainty associated with
making such an inference.
Assessment of Schum's Theory of Uncertainty
Schum's evidence charting appears to be a useful means of
analyzing chains of nonmonotonic inferences and organizing all of
the relevant evidence. When inferences are decomposed into
chains, the warrant for each step of the chain can be determined
and the ways in which uncertainty enters the inference can be
made more explicit. Schum's method forces us to determine the
function of each item of evidence in warranting the findings.
There are difficulties, however, with the adequacy of likelihood
ratios to quantify the probative value of direct evidence. In
particular, it is doubtful that a likelihood ratio provides any
explanation for the possible sources of error in an inference or
adequately characterizes the kinds of uncertainty associated with
the inference.
Schum's method distinguishes three roles for propositions in
warranting an inferential step: they can function as generalizations,
descriptions of ancillary evidence, or descriptions or content of the
direct evidenceY The use of any particular generalization to help
warrant an inference could introduce error in at least two ways.
The first way is if the warrant for the generalization itself is weak.
To the extent that the generalization is unwarranted or weakly
warranted, the generalization cannot perform a warranting role.
Schum provides no theory of warrant for generalizations. 8
Without an analysis of the warrant for generalizations, however,
Schum's method leaves a major source of uncertainty
unexplained. 9
Moreover, the degree of warrant for the
generalization used surely influences the probative value of the
evidence for the inference. If a generalization has very little basis,
any inference made in reliance on that generalization should have
diminished warrant as well. Part of Schum's theory is that the
likelihood ratio LE. is an adequate measure of the probative force
B.

87 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 263; cf. KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 82
(stating that even tangible evidence, such as bullets or weapons, are charted in his method
as propositions, since "[n]o item of tangible evidence 'speaks for itself"').
88 See supranote 64 and accompanying text.
89 The requirement of a "hedge" within a generalization is not a sufficient answer. A
hedge term can indicate the intended quantification for the proposition-for example, that
the generalization might be true in "all," "many," "forty-two percent," or "at least one" of
the cases. But there can still be uncertainty about whether the generalization (with its
intended quantification) is true or false. Uncertainty is about the potential for error,
whatever the generalization's quantification.
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of E* for E. But it is unclear how the likelihood ratio Prob(E* E)
/ Prob(E* Not-E) should be influenced by the degree of warrant
for an applicable generalization. That is, it is unclear what method
the factfinder should use to "adjust" one or both likelihoods to
take into account the degree of warrant for the generalization.
Perhaps my theory of uncertainty for scientific warrant, which
was discussed in Part II, could provide a theory of uncertainty for
Schum's generalizations.
The rationale for my theory is
sufficiently general, so that it can be applied to noncausal
generalizations (such as statistical generalizations about a
population) and to generalizations with nonscientific warrant. 9°
But adding my theory to Schum's would cause a serious problem
for Schum's use of the likelihood ratio as an integrated measure of
probative value. The theory of scientific warrant suggests that the
uncertainties inherent in a generalization cannot be characterized
by a single probability.9 The likelihood ratio LE. contains far too
little information about the nature of the underlying uncertainties,
and sheds little or no light on the reasons why the conclusion
might be inaccurate. To save the sufficiency of likelihood ratios,
Schum needs an account of how to quantify the warrant for
generalizations and how to adjust likelihood ratios appropriately.
The second source of inferential error introduced through
generalizations is the risk of applying an inappropriate
generalization in a particular case. This is a possible source of
error even if the generalization is itself warranted. For example, it
may be a true generalization that police officers usually do not lie
under oath, but should this generalization be applied to Officer
Smith's testimony?92 Schum confronts this problem by defining
ancillary evidence as evidence that helps to warrant the application
of a generalization in a particular case. By definition, however, the
probative force of the ancillary evidence is not a function of event
E, nor can it be captured by a likelihood ratio relative to E.
Schum is candid that a major reason for creating a separate
category of "ancillary" evidence is that if ancillary evidence A
were directly linked to E, the Bayesian portion of his theory would
require assigning values to Prob(AIE) and Prob(AINot-E).93 But
assigning such values does not seem promising, especially since
there may be very little causal relationship between event E and
90 See supra Part II.B.
91 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
92 Perhaps Schum merely assumes what logicians call a "direct inference" from the
statistical generalization to the probability about a specific case. This is, however, a
complicated inference when it comes to providing warrant. See Walker, supra note 4, at
279-307.
93 See SCHUM, supra note 14, at 188-90.
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the evidence A. 94 Schum concludes that the probative force of
ancillary evidence must be graded into ordinal categories. 9 This
makes it difficult to mathematically integrate the probative value
of ancillary evidence into the likelihood ratio for direct evidence.
To capture the probative value of ancillary evidence in the
likelihood ratio for the direct evidence, one would have to "adjust"
the constituent likelihoods based on the ordinal probative value of
the ancillary evidence.
Making the likelihoods subjective, as Schum does,
acknowledges the problem without solving it.96 As measures
merely of the factfinder's degree of confidence, subjective
likelihoods can be freely adjusted to reflect the factfinder's
assessment of the ancillary evidence and the factfinder's degree of
confidence in the generalizations employed. But there is nothing
to warrant the subjective likelihood assignments, except the
intuition and authority of the person making those assignments.
Theories of uncertainty are useful if they help explain the warrant
for a nonmonotonic inference by explaining the possible sources of
error in such inferences. The warrant for an inference, or for an
assessment of the probative value of evidence, consists of the
reasons why the conclusion is probably true. Relying on the mere
fact that someone thinks it is probably true threatens to shortcircuit the hunt for warrant.
Schum's theory retreats too quickly to the shelter of
subjective likelihood assignments, instead of probing further for
the warrant for those assignments. This means that the theory not
only falls short, but also undermines the likelihood ratio as a
promising source of warrant. The likelihood ratio does seem to
play an important epistemic role in assessing the probative value
of direct evidence. The value of the likelihood ratio is that it can
be used to compare two causal relationships: (1) the causal link
from event E to the occurrence of the evidence E*, and (2) the
causal link from the world without event E to the occurrence of
E*. The question whether E* is more likely to occur if E occurred
than if E did not occur seems highly relevant to the probative
value of E* for E.97 A promising direction for Schum's theory
would be to require any value assigned to L to be warranted by a
See id. at 150-55.
95 See id. at 187-92, 245-51, 272-74, 301-06.
96 Schum considers probabilities, including likelihoods (conditional probabilities), to
be subjective in nature. See id. at 40, 52-54, 209-10, 263-65; KADANE & SCHUM, supra
note 3, at 24, 117-18, 267-68.
97 On the use of reasonably well-specified and reasonably stable causal systems to
warrant assigning probabilities to sequences of events, see Walker, supra note 4, at 279-81,
292-97.
94
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causal account. The likelihood ratio for direct evidence is
potentially useful if it is warranted causally, but, a precipitous
retreat to subjective probabilities hobbles that potential.
A final problem for Schum's theory is that every inferential
step could have multiple warranting generalizations. For example,
consider the possible generalizations for concluding that Officer
Smith is testifying truthfully. One generalization might be that
"police officers usually do not lie when testifying under oath." But,
a factfinder might also be tempted to use the generalization that
"men older than forty do not lie under oath," or even that "blueeyed people never lie." Yet all three generalizations, and an
infinite number of others, could be invoked to warrant an
inference about Officer Smith's veracity. By what method should
a factfinder prioritize the possible generalizations by their degrees
of warrant? When multiple generalizations are possible and seem
to have different degrees of warrant, what is the method for rank
ordering them with respect to their warrant? And how are
different degrees of warrant for multiple generalizations to be
combined into a single value? This problem is critical for any
inference, because even a seemingly simple inference can be
supported by multiple generalizations.98 The question is whether
there is any epistemically useful method of doing so. It seems
likely that any successful attempt at solving this problem would be
accompanied by a theory of uncertainty to explain the possible
sources of error.
CONCLUSION

Legal factfinding routinely relies on nonmonotonic inferences
and on the incomplete evidence underlying them. Theories of
uncertainty can help warrant findings of fact in such situations. A
theory of uncertainty explains the extent to which the available
evidence warrants a particular conclusion, what kinds and degrees
of uncertainty are associated with that conclusion, and how
additional evidence might affect the warrant for that inference. It
explains the possible sources of error in nonmonotonic inferences.
Unlike a theory of validity in traditional logic, which explains why
truth is necessarily preserved from certain premises to certain
98 This is a different problem than the regress that is possible because any inference
can be decomposed further, see KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 3, at 52, 246, and because
more generalizations are needed to support the inferential use of ancillary evidence, see
SCHUM, supra note 14, at 187-92. The problem of adjusting probative force to reflect
multiple generalizations must be faced in order to apply the method to any inference at all.
In this respect, it resembles the problem of combining multiple items of evidence, to which
Schum devotes considerable attention. See id. at 366-449.
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conclusions, a theory of uncertainty explains the possibility of
falsehood and the risk of error. If we understand how the
evidentiary premises could be true but the proposed conclusion
false, then we understand the potential for error associated with
making that finding on the basis of the legally available evidence.
A theory of uncertainty has an explanatory function roughly
parallel to the role played by a theory of causation in an empirical
science. Just as a good causal theory should increase the accuracy
of predictions about events, a good theory of uncertainty should
increase the accuracy of findings of fact, at least in the long run. It
does this by clarifying linguistic meaning, by identifying logical
relationships among apparently warranted but inconsistent
propositions, and by providing causal explanations linking the
events at issue to the evidentiary events. Linguistic, logical, and
causal accounts of the legally available evidence and the possible
findings are integrated into a single theory about which inferences
are more warranted than others.
Understanding the uncertainty or potential for error in an
inference might lead to effective measures to reduce that
uncertainty and increase the likelihood of more accurate
factfinding.
A good theory might help us decide which
uncertainties are more critical than others and how productive it
might be to reduce some uncertainties rather than others. In some
situations, the risk of factfinding error might be reduced through
better reasoning or obtaining new information.
Whether
factfinding accuracy actually increases even in the long run,
however, depends upon many factors, only one of which is the
adequacy of the adopted theories of uncertainty. In other
situations, a party or the factfinder might decide that the residual
uncertainties for a finding are tolerable and that the cost of further
analysis or evidence gathering outweighs the expected benefits.
Instrumental to such pragmatic decisions is an understanding of
the nature of the risk of error-an understanding based on a
theory of uncertainty.
This Article also examined two particular theories of
uncertainty. The first theory of uncertainty, presented in Part II, is
a theory of uncertainty for scientific warrant. It is especially useful
in explaining the possible sources of error in conclusions about
generic causation, particularly when those conclusions are
warranted by scientific evidence. This same theory of uncertainty
should be applicable to statistical (noncausal) generalizations and
to generalizations warranted by ordinary experience.
The
reasoning behind the theory is general in applicability. According
to this theory, for example, any proposition about generic
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causation has inherent in it uncertainties introduced by the
concepts employed, the classifications or measurements
performed, the calculations made, the samples selected and
analyzed, the mathematical models used, and the causal
interpretations imposed. If any of these types of uncertainty is
unacceptably high, there may be techniques for reducing the risk
of error to acceptable levels. The appropriate technique depends
upon the type of uncertainty to be reduced. Moreover, there are
various techniques for characterizing the degree of residual
uncertainty of many of these types.
The second theory discussed in this Article is Schum's method
of evidence charting and use of likelihood ratios to measure the
probative force of an inference. Schum's theory, discussed in Part
III, is especially valuable in analyzing the sources of error in
inferences about unique historical events.
Schum classifies
warranting evidentiary propositions into three categories
(generalizations, ancillary evidence, and directly relevant
evidence), and uses likelihood ratios to quantify the probative
force of an inference based on directly relevant evidence. This
theory has advantages, but also contains several weaknesses. A
number of these weaknesses can be remedied, however, and
Schum's methods for analyzing such inferences might be
improved. For example, if the theory of uncertainty for scientific
warrant discussed in Part II were used to supplement Schum's
theory of generalizations, then the factfinder could analyze the
warrant for the generalizations identified through Schum's
evidence charting. The theory of uncertainty for scientific warrant,
however, undermines Schum's Use of the likelihood ratio as a
single measure of probative value.
These general remarks about the nature of a theory of
uncertainty, together with the discussions of two leading examples
of such theories, map out a promising approach to warranting
nonmonotonic inferences. What is needed to warrant such
inferences is an appreciation of the epistemic limits of what we
know, an understanding of the nature of what we do not know,
and a theory about how the information that is missing is likely to
affect the accuracy of our findings.

